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Abstract
In this paper, we discuss security of the six-state quantum key distribution proto-
col against intercept/resend attacks and collective attacks. For the intercept/resend
attacks, we evaluate a probability that the legitimate users, Alice and Bob, do not
notice interference caused by the eavesdropper Eve and a probability that Eve ob-
tains a secret bit sent by Alice. For the collective attacks, we estimate not only the
above two probabilities but also Eve’s Shannon information. In the assessment of
the security against the collective attacks, imposing looser constraints upon Eve’s
strategies than Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin, we reach substantially the same
result as their study. In other words, although we let Eve’s strategies satisfy lower
symmetry than Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin, both their work and ours attain
the same conclusion, i.e. the identical, unique, and optimum strategy. This im-
plies that we obtain Eve’s best tactic by applying simpler conditions to it than
Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin, so that this result is novel. Finally, we consider
a relation between the six-state protocol and the E91 scheme. We show that the
intercept/resend attacks can always be described by hidden variable models. In
contrast, we demonstrate that we cannot regard the collective attacks as the hidden
variable theories if the disturbance is smaller than 1/3.
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1 Introduction
The six-state quantum key distribution protocol [1, 2] is a natural extension of the well-
known BB84 four-state scheme, which was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984
[3]. The six-state protocol uses three bases rather than two ones, which are utilized by
the BB84 scheme. Although the six-state quantum key distribution protocol is regarded
as less practical than the BB84 scenario, it has theoretically interesting features, so that
many researchers have investigated it.
The BB84 procedure of quantum cryptography is designed for realizing secure key
distribution between two parties, Alice and Bob. In the original BB84 scheme, Alice
randomly chooses between two conjugate quantum bases in a two-dimensional Hilbert
space and sends secretly a random binary number with a quantum bit (qubit) in the
chosen basis. On the one hand, if Bob detects the qubit transmitted from Alice with the
identical basis that Alice chooses, Bob obtains the correct secret bit. On the other hand,
if Bob measures a state of the qubit sent by Alice in the basis which is different from
Alice’s one, an outcome of his observation is totally random. During the BB84 scheme,
Alice sends one of four states included in the two conjugate bases at random.
Because the BB84 protocol has a long tradition, its properties have been studied
eagerly and vastly [4, 5]. Especially, its practical aspects have been investigated very
much [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. The BB84 scheme was proven unconditionally secure against
an enemy who was able to mount arbitrary attacks permitted by quantum mechanics
[12, 13, 14, 15].
Because the six-state protocol is a direct descendant of the BB84 procedure, it inherits
many qualities of the BB84 scheme. The six-state protocol has been studied already by
many researchers. Bruß examined security of the six-state protocol against eavesdropping
on a single qubit, which was not classified as a collective attack [1]. Bechmann-Pasquinucci
and Gisin investigated collective and coherent attacks on the six-state protocol [2]. The
unconditional security of the six-state scheme has been proved already [16]. Information-
theoretic security proof for the six-state protocol with one-way error correction and privacy
amplification was presented [17]. Intercept/resend attacks on the six-state protocol over
noisy channels were examined [18]. The security proof of the six-state protocol with
threshold detectors was investigated for practical purposes [19].
In the current paper, we examine security of the six-state protocol against inter-
cept/resend attacks and collective attacks. First, for the intercept/resend attacks, we
estimate a probability that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve’s illegal acts and a prob-
ability that Eve obtains a secret bit sent by Alice. Second, for the collective attacks,
using Bruß’s results [1], we estimate not only the above two probabilities but also Eve’s
Shannon information. In the analyses of both these attacks, we find evidences that the
six-state protocol is safer than the BB84 scheme.
Third, we show that we can regard the six-state protocol as a simplified version of the
E91 scenario, which is a quantum key distribution scheme proposed by Ekert in 1991 [20].
From the connection between the six-state protocol and the E91 scheme, we can show that
the intercept/resend attack is equivalent to the hidden variable model. Contrastingly, we
demonstrate that the collective attack cannot be described by the hidden variable theory
if the disturbance is smaller than 1/3.
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In order to investigate the security against the collective attack, we apply looser con-
straints to Eve’s strategies than Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin and we arrive at sub-
stantially the same result as their work [2]. In other words, although we impose lower sym-
metry upon Eve’s strategies than Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin, both of them attain
the same conclusion, i.e. the identical, unique, and optimum strategy. This implies that
we obtain Eve’s best tactic by assuming simpler conditions than Bechmann-Pasquinucci
and Gisin, so that this result is novel.
In the current paper, we emphasize that analyses of the security for the six-state
protocol are simpler than those for the BB84 scheme. This is because the number of the
quantum sates that the six-state protocol uses is larger than the BB84 scheme, so that
more restrictions are placed on the six-state protocol than the BB84 scenario. This fact
makes the problem concerning the six-state protocol easier than the BB84 procedure. In
fact, when we look for the optimum strategy for the collective attack on the six-state
protocol, we have to optimize only a single real parameter. Contrastingly, according to
Cirac and Gisin’s work [21], if we want to find the optimum strategy for the collective
attack on the BB84 scheme, we need to carry out optimization of two real parameters.
This simplicity of the six-state protocol suggests that Alice and Bob can predict strategies
of Eve’s attacks more easily than the BB84 procedure. This is one of the advantages that
the six-state protocol owns.
Because the unconditional security of the six-state protocol has been proved already,
some might complain that precise analyses of the intercept/resend attacks and collective
attacks are useless. However, we think that each attack has to be examined in detail for
practical uses because investigation of actual defects included in each Eve’s attack gives
technical merits to Alice and Bob.
As mentioned above, the six-state protocol is the natural extended version of the
BB84 scheme. In the BB84 scheme, Alice and Bob communicate with each other using
one of two orthonormal bases, which is defined on the two-dimensional Hilbert space,
independently. We name these bases the z basis and the x basis. The z basis consists of
the following two vectors:
|0z〉 = |0〉 =
(
1
0
)
,
|1z〉 = |1〉 =
(
0
1
)
. (1)
The x basis is formed from
|0x〉 = (1/
√
2)(|0〉+ |1〉),
|1x〉 = (1/
√
2)(|0〉 − |1〉). (2)
In addition to these bases, the six-state protocol utilize the following y basis:
|0y〉 = (1/
√
2)(|0〉+ i|1〉),
|1y〉 = (1/
√
2)(|0〉 − i|1〉). (3)
Hence, in the six-state protocol, the legitimate users send and receive six vectors,
{|0z〉, |1z〉}, {|0x〉, |1x〉}, and {|0y〉, |1y〉}, at random with an equal probability.
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The current paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we give a brief review of Bruß’s
results. In Sec. 3, we examine the security of the six-state protocol against the inter-
cept/resend attacks. In Sec. 4, we investigate Eve’s optimum strategy of the collective
attack. In Sec. 5, we evaluate the Shannon information obtained by Eve in the collective
attack. In Sec. 6, we study a connection between the six-state protocol and the E91
scenario. In Sec. 7, we give discussion and the conclusions.
2 Results obtained by Bruß
In this section, we review results obtained by Bruß [1]. These results play an important
role in Sec. 4 for analysing security of the six-state protocol against collective attacks.
We consider Eve’s following illegal acts. First, Eve lets her own probe interact with
a single qubit which is sent by Alice through the quantum channel. That is to say, Eve
applies a unitary transformation to both her probe and the single qubit transmitted from
Alice. Second, Eve sends the single qubit to Bob. Third, Eve leaves her own probe
untouched until Alice and Bob disclose their public discussion via the classical channel.
Fourth, depending on Alice and Bob’s public information about which basis is used for
their quantum transmission, the z basis, the x basis, or the y basis, Eve measures her
probe and guesses at a secret bit Alice sends.
In the above procedure, the most general unitary operator U that Eve applies to her
probe and the transmitted single qubit is given as follows:
U |0〉|X〉 =
√
F |0〉|A〉+√1− F |1〉|B〉,
U |1〉|X〉 =
√
F ′|1〉|C〉+√1− F ′|0〉|D〉, (4)
where |X〉 denotes the initial state of Eve’s probe, and |A〉, |B〉, |C〉, and |D〉 represent
arbitrary normalized vectors. Here, we assume that Alice and Bob send and receive the
single qubit with the z basis, {|0z〉, |1z〉} = {|0〉, |1〉}. Then, on the one hand, a probability
that Alice transmits |0z〉 and Bob detects |0z〉 is equal to the fidelity F . On the other
hand, a probability that Alice emits |1z〉 and Bob obtains |1z〉 is given by the fidelity F ′. If
F 6= F ′ holds, Alice and Bob can repeat quantum communications with the z basis many
times, obtain values of F and F ′ as statistical averages, become aware of F 6= F ′, and
finally notice Eve’s malicious acts. Hence, Eve had better make an attack with F = F ′.
Therefore, from now on, we assume that F = F ′ is satisfied in Eq. (4).
It is clear that the dimension of a Hilbert space for Eve’s probe is equal to four at the
most because the states of the probe are given by |A〉, |B〉, |C〉, and |D〉 in Eq. (4) except
the initial state |X〉. Then, we can put 1/2 ≤ F < 1 without loss of generality.
Moreover, we assume that the fidelity is equal to F even if Alice and Bob communicate
with both the x basis and the y basis. First, we think about the x basis. We let the
following equation hold:
|〈0x|U |0x〉|X〉|2 = |〈1x|U |1x〉|X〉|2 = F. (5)
Then, we obtain
〈A|B〉+ 〈A|D〉+ 〈B|A〉+ 〈B|C〉+ 〈C|B〉+ 〈C|D〉+ 〈D|A〉+ 〈D|C〉 = 0, (6)
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F = (1/2)[1 + FRe〈A|C〉+ (1− F )Re〈B|D〉]. (7)
Second, we consider a case relating to the y basis. We assume that the following equation
is satisfied:
|〈0y|U |0y〉|X〉|2 = |〈1y|U |1y〉|X〉|2 = F. (8)
Thus, we obtain
−〈A|D〉+ 〈A|B〉+ 〈D|A〉+ 〈D|C〉 − 〈B|A〉 − 〈B|C〉 − 〈C|D〉+ 〈C|B〉 = 0, (9)
F = (1/2)[1 + FRe〈A|C〉 − (1− F )Re〈B|D〉]. (10)
Furthermore, because U is a unitary operator, U |0〉|X〉 and U |1〉|X〉 are orthogonal to
each other. Thus, we reach a relation,
〈A|D〉+ 〈B|C〉 = 0. (11)
Because of Eqs. (6) and (9), we obtain
〈A|B〉+ 〈D|A〉+ 〈D|C〉+ 〈C|B〉 = 0. (12)
From Eqs. (11) and (12), we attain
〈A|B〉+ 〈D|C〉 = 0. (13)
Equations (7) and (10) lead to the following relation:
Re〈B|D〉 = 0. (14)
Substituting Eq. (14) into Eqs. (7) and (10), we arrive at
Re〈A|C〉 = 2− 1
F
. (15)
From the above discussion, we finally come to Bruß’s conclusion that Eqs. (11), (13),
(14), and (15) hold.
3 The security against the intercept/resend attacks
In this section, we consider a situation where Eve makes the intercept/resend attack on
the quantum channel. Eve observes a single qubit sent by Alice with an arbitrary two-
dimensional orthonormal basis {|ξ0〉, |ξ1〉} and resends an alternative qubit whose state is
given by either |ξ0〉 or |ξ1〉 to Bob according to the result of her measurement.
First of all, we define projection operators as
P (ξ0) = |ξ0〉〈ξ0|, P (ξ1) = |ξ1〉〈ξ1|. (16)
Next, we consider explicit forms of P (ξ0) and P (ξ1). We can write down an arbitrary
rotation matrix of SU(2), V (α, β, γ), as follows [22]:
V (α, β, γ) = exp
(
− i
2
ασz
)
exp
(
− i
2
βσy
)
exp
(
− i
2
γσz
)
=
(
e−i(α+γ)/2 cos(β/2) −e−i(α−γ)/2 sin(β/2)
ei(α−γ)/2 sin(β/2) ei(α+γ)/2 cos(β/2)
)
, (17)
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where 0 ≤ α < 4pi, 0 ≤ β < 4pi, and 0 ≤ γ < 4pi. Then, P (ξ0) and P (ξ1) are given in the
forms,
P (ξ0) = V (α, β, γ)
(
1 0
0 0
)
V †(α, β, γ)
=
(
cos2(β/2) (1/2)e−iα sin(β)
(1/2)eiα sin(β) sin2(β/2)
)
, (18)
P (ξ1) = V (α, β, γ)
(
0 0
0 1
)
V †(α, β, γ)
=
(
sin2(β/2) −(1/2)e−iα sin(β)
−(1/2)eiα sin(β) cos2(β/2)
)
. (19)
If Eve detects |ξ0〉, she judges that Alice sends a secret bit ‘0’ through the quantum
channel. By contrast, observing |ξ1〉, Eve believes that Alice emits a secret bit ‘1’ via the
quantum transmission.
We define Pt as a probability that Eve makes an accurate guess at a secret bit Alice
sends in the case where both Alice and Bob choose the t basis for t ∈ {x, y, z}. We also
define Qt as a probability that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve’s illegal acts in the case
both of them communicate with the t basis. Then, Pt and Qt are written in the forms
Pt =
1
2
∑
i∈{0,1}
〈it|P (ξi)|it〉,
Qt =
1
2
∑
i∈{0,1}
∑
j∈{0,1}
[〈it|P (ξj)|it〉]2 for t ∈ {x, y, z}. (20)
Substitution of Eqs. (1), (2), (3), (18), and (19) into Eq. (20) gives
Pz = cos
2(β/2),
Qz = cos
4(β/2) + sin4(β/2),
Px = (1/2)(1 + cosα sin β),
Qx = (1/8)[5 + cos(2α)− 2 cos2 α cos(2β)],
Py = (1/2)(1 + sinα sin β),
Qy = (1/8)[5− cos(2α)− 2 sin2 α cos(2β)]. (21)
Here, we assume that Eve selects strategies that have symmetry Px = Py = Pz for
eavesdropping. Thus, because of Px = Py, we obtain sinα = cosα. Then, we can put a
range of α values as 0 ≤ α < 2pi without loss of generality. Hence, we arrive at α = pi/4,
5pi/4.
First, we consider a case where α = pi/4 is satisfied. Then, from Eq. (21), we obtain
Pz = cos
2(β/2),
Px = Py = (1/2)[1 + (1/
√
2) sin β]. (22)
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Here, we can put a range of β values as 0 ≤ β < 2pi without loss of generality. Because
of Px = Py = Pz, we obtain two values for β as
β = 2 arccos
[
−
√
1
6
(3−
√
3)
]
≃ 4.097, (23)
β = 2 arccos
[√1
6
(3 +
√
3)
]
≃ 0.9553. (24)
On the one hand, if β is given by Eq. (23), Px, Py, and Pz can be estimated at
Px = Py = Pz =
1
6
(3−
√
3) ≃ 0.2113. (25)
On the other hand, if β is given by Eq. (24), they are equal to
Px = Py = Pz =
1
6
(3 +
√
3) ≃ 0.7887. (26)
Thus, we conclude that Eq. (24) is the optimum solution.
Second, we consider a case where α = 5pi/4 holds. Then, from Eq. (21), we obtain
Pz = cos
2(β/2),
Px = Py = (1/2)[1− (1/
√
2) sinβ]. (27)
Because of Px = Py = Pz, putting 0 ≤ β < 2pi, we obtain the following two values for β:
β = 2 arccos
[√1
6
(3−
√
3)
]
≃ 2.186, (28)
β = 2 arccos
[
−
√
1
6
(3 +
√
3)
]
≃ 5.328. (29)
If β is given by Eq. (28), we arrive at Eq. (25). In contrast, if β is given by Eq. (29), we
reach Eq. (26). Hence, we come to a conclusion that Eq. (29) is the optimum solution.
If α = pi/4 holds and β is given by Eq. (24), we obtain
Qx = Qy = Qz = 2/3. (30)
Similarly, if we put α = 5pi/4 and Eq. (29) is satisfied, we obtain Eq. (30), too.
Throughout the above discussion, we only impose the symmetry Px = Py = Pz upon
Eve’s strategies. Thus, Eve’s optimum intercept/resend attacks are given by α = pi/4,
β = 2 arccos[
√
(1/6)(3 +
√
3)] and α = 5pi/4, β = 2 arccos[−
√
(1/6)(3 +
√
3)]. If Eve
makes the optimum intercept/resend attack, the probability that Eve guesses right at the
secret bit Alice sends is equal to around 0.7887 and the probability that Alice and Bob
do not become aware of Eve’s malicious acts is given by 2/3.
Here, we compare the six-state protocol and the BB84 scheme concerning the inter-
cept/resend attack. For the BB84 scenario, Eve’s best strategy for the intercept/resend
attack is projection measurement with the Breidbart basis [4]. Using the Breidbart basis
for the BB84 scheme, Eve can guess right at the secret bit sent by Alice with a proba-
bility (1/4)(2 +
√
2) ≃ 0.8536 and Alice and Bob cannot notice Eve’s illegal acts with
a probability 3/4. Thus, the six-state protocol is safer than the BB84 scheme for Eve’s
intercept/resend attack.
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4 Eve’s optimum strategy of the collective attack
In this section, we examine Eve’s optimum strategy of the collective attack on the six-state
protocol. In the collective attack, Eve looks into each qubit sent by Alice individually
using entanglement between her probe and the qubit. What she has to do is as follows.
First, Eve prepares her own probe whose initial state is given by |X〉. Second, Eve causes
interaction between her probe and the single qubit sent by Alice with a proper unitary
transformation. Third, leaving her probe untouched, Eve sends the single qubit to Bob.
Fourth, according to Alice and Bob’s public discussion about which basis they use for the
quantum transmission, the x basis, the y basis, or the z basis, Eve observes her probe.
Fifth, from a result of her measurement of the probe, Eve makes a guess at the secret bit
sent by Alice. In this attack, it is important that Eve can change a method for measuring
her probe depending on public information Alice and Bob disclose through the classical
channel.
The process explained above is equivalent to that discussed by Bruß in Sec. 2. Thus,
throughout this section, we assume that Eq. (4) is satisfied with F = F ′. Moreover, we
assume that the results obtained by Bruß hold, that is to say, we can put Eqs. (11), (13),
(14), and (15) into effect during this section. Then, we adopt the following notation for
the sake of convenience hereafter,
U |0t〉|X〉 = |0t〉|Et00〉+ |1t〉|Et01〉,
U |1t〉|X〉 = |0t〉|Et10〉+ |1t〉|Et11〉 for t ∈ {x, y, z}. (31)
From Eqs. (1), (2), (3), (4) with F = F ′, and (31), we obtain the following relations,
|Ez00〉 =
√
F |A〉,
|Ez01〉 =
√
1− F |B〉,
|Ez10〉 =
√
1− F |D〉,
|Ez11〉 =
√
F |C〉, (32)
|Ex00〉 = (1/2)[
√
F (|A〉+ |C〉) +√1− F (|B〉+ |D〉)],
|Ex01〉 = (1/2)[
√
F (|A〉 − |C〉) +√1− F (|D〉 − |B〉)],
|Ex10〉 = (1/2)[
√
F (|A〉 − |C〉) +√1− F (|B〉 − |D〉)],
|Ex11〉 = (1/2)[
√
F (|A〉+ |C〉)−√1− F (|B〉+ |D〉)], (33)
|Ey00〉 = (1/2)[
√
F (|A〉+ |C〉) + i√1− F (|D〉 − |B〉)],
|Ey01〉 = (1/2)[
√
F (|A〉 − |C〉) + i√1− F (|D〉+ |B〉)],
|Ey10〉 = (1/2)[
√
F (|A〉 − |C〉)− i√1− F (|B〉+ |D〉)],
|Ey11〉 = (1/2)[
√
F (|A〉+ |C〉) + i√1− F (|B〉 − |D〉)]. (34)
Here, we impose the following symmetry on Eve’s attack in analogy with Cirac and
Gisin’s work [21]:
〈Ezij |Ezkl〉 = 〈Exij |Exkl〉 = 〈Eyij |Eykl〉 for i, j, k, l ∈ {0, 1}. (35)
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This assumption implies that Eve’s optimum strategy forces Eve’s unitary operator U
into acting on the transmitted qubit and the probe in the same way regardless of which
basis Alice and Bob choose, in other words, the t basis ∀t ∈ {x, y, z}. From the next
paragraph, we investigate how Eve’s unitary operator U is affected by this condition of
Eq. (35).
From Eqs. (11), (13), (14), (15), (32), (33), and (34), we apparently obtain the follow-
ing relations:
〈Et00|Et00〉 = 〈Et11|Et11〉 = F,
〈Et01|Et01〉 = 〈Et10|Et10〉 = 1− F for t ∈ {x, y, z}. (36)
Moreover, on the one hand, Eq. (32) leads to
〈Ez00|Ez11〉 = F 〈A|C〉. (37)
On the other hand, with the help of Eqs. (14), (15), and (33), we obtain
〈Ex00|Ex11〉 = 2F − 1− (i/2)
√
F (1− F )[Im(〈A|B〉 − 〈D|C〉) + Im(〈A|D〉 − 〈B|C〉)]. (38)
Substitution of Eqs. (11), (13), (37), and (38) into 〈Ez00|Ez11〉 = 〈Ex00|Ex11〉 gives
Im〈A|C〉 = −
√
(1− F )/F (α+ β), (39)
where
α = Im〈A|B〉 = −Im〈D|C〉,
β = Im〈A|D〉 = −Im〈B|C〉. (40)
Furthermore, from Eqs. (14), (15), and (34), we obtain
〈Ey00|Ey11〉 = 2F − 1 + (i/2)
√
F (1− F )[Re(〈A|B〉 − 〈D|C〉)− Re(〈A|D〉 − 〈B|C〉)]. (41)
Substitution of Eqs. (11), (13), (37), and (41) into 〈Ez00|Ez11〉 = 〈Ey00|Ey11〉 leads to
Im〈A|C〉 =
√
(1− F )/F (a− b), (42)
where
a = Re〈A|B〉 = −Re〈D|C〉,
b = Re〈A|D〉 = −Re〈B|C〉. (43)
From Eqs. (39) and (42), we derive
−(α + β) = a− b. (44)
Because of Eqs. (14) and (32), we obtain
〈Ez01|Ez10〉 = i(1− F )Im〈B|D〉. (45)
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Contrastingly, from Eqs. (14), (15), (33), and (40), we reach
〈Ex01|Ex10〉 = i
√
F (1− F )(α− β). (46)
Thus, with the help of 〈Ez01|Ez10〉 = 〈Ex01|Ex10〉, we arrive at√
(1− F )/F Im〈B|D〉 = α− β. (47)
Next, Eqs. (14), (15), (34), and (43) provide us with
〈Ey01|Ey10〉 = −i
√
F (1− F )(a+ b). (48)
Thus, 〈Ez01|Ez10〉 = 〈Ey01|Ey10〉 leads to
−
√
(1− F )/F Im〈B|D〉 = a + b. (49)
Then, from Eqs. (47) and (49), we obtain
α− β = −(a + b). (50)
From Eqs. (44) and (50), we reach
α = −a, β = b. (51)
Moreover, from Eqs. (32), (40), and (43), we attain
〈Ez00|Ez01〉 =
√
F (1− F )(a+ iα). (52)
By contrast, because of Eqs. (13), (14), (33), (40), and (43), we obtain
〈Ex00|Ex01〉 = −(i/2)F Im〈A|C〉+ (i/2)(1− F )Im〈B|D〉+
√
F (1− F )b. (53)
The relation 〈Ez00|Ez01〉 = 〈Ex00|Ex01〉 leads to
a = b, (54)
√
F (1− F )α = −(1/2)F Im〈A|C〉+ (1/2)(1− F )Im〈B|D〉. (55)
Furthermore, with the help of Eqs. (13), (14), (34), (40), and (43), we arrive at
〈Ey00|Ey01〉 = −(i/2)F Im〈A|C〉 − (i/2)(1− F )Im〈B|D〉 −
√
F (1− F )β. (56)
From the relation 〈Ez00|Ez01〉 = 〈Ey00|Ey01〉, we obtain
a = −β, (57)
√
F (1− F )α = −(1/2)F Im〈A|C〉 − (1/2)(1− F )Im〈B|D〉. (58)
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Because of Eqs. (55) and (58), we reach
Im〈B|D〉 = 0, (59)
so that, from Eq. (14), we obtain 〈B|D〉 = 0. Thus,with the help of Eq. (45), we attain
〈Et01|Et10〉 = 0 ∀t ∈ {x, y, z}.
Because of Eqs. (49) and (59), we reach
a+ b = 0. (60)
Equations. (54) and (60) lead to
a = b = 0. (61)
Thus, from Eq. (51), we derive
α = β = 0. (62)
Hence, with the help of Eqs. (55), (59), and (62), we obtain
Im〈A|C〉 = 0. (63)
From Eq. (52), we reach 〈Et00|Et01〉 = 0 ∀t ∈ {x, y, z}.
Because of the above discussion, we obtain a relation,
〈A|B〉 = 〈D|C〉 = 〈A|D〉 = 〈B|C〉 = 0. (64)
From the above results, the following relations are automatically satisfied:
〈Et00|Et10〉 = 0,
〈Et11|Et01〉 = 0,
〈Et11|Et10〉 = 0 for t ∈ {x, y, z} (65)
Finally, we come to the conclusion that Eve’s unitary operator U is uniquely and
perfectly determined by a single parameter Re〈A|C〉 and the following relations hold:
F =
1
2− Re〈A|C〉 , (66)
〈Et00|Et11〉 = FRe〈A|C〉 ∀t ∈ {x, y, z}. (67)
At the close of this section, we have to point out that Eqs. (66) and (67) were provided
in Ref. [2]. In Ref. [2], although Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin started arguments from
different constraints imposed on the unitary operator U , their study and ours reach the
same results.
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5 The Shannon information obtained by Eve in the
collective attack
In this section, in order to consider the security against Eve’s collective attack discussed in
Sec. 4, we evaluate the following physical quantities. The first quantity is the probability
that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve’s interference. The second one is the probability
that Eve guesses right at the secret bit sent by Alice. The third one is the Shannon
information Eve obtains.
First, we define QAB as the probability that Alice and Bob do not become aware of
Eve’s illegal acts. Because QAB is a probability that Alice and Bob detect the same bit
value with the same basis, it can be written down as
QAB =
1
6
∑
t∈{x,y,z}
∑
i∈{0,1}
〈Etii|Etii〉
= F. (68)
Second, we define PE as the probability that Eve makes an accurate guess at the
secret bit sent by Alice. We estimate PE as follows. We assume that both Alice and
Bob send and receive the qubit with the z basis. Then, Eve has to distinguish between
four quantum states {|Ezij〉 : i, j ∈ {0, 1}}. We describe a unique single parameter that
characterizes Eve’s unitary operator U as
Re〈A|C〉 = cos θ. (69)
From Eq. (66) and (69), we can also write the fidelity F with cos θ. Because of the
discussion in Sec. 4, we obtain the following relations:
〈Ez00|Ez01〉 = 0, 〈Ez00|Ez10〉 = 0, 〈Ez00|Ez11〉 = F cos θ,
〈Ez01|Ez10〉 = 0, 〈Ez01|Ez11〉 = 0, 〈Ez10|Ez11〉 = 0. (70)
Thus, on the one hand, Eve cannot distinguish between |Ez00〉 and |Ez11〉 with a probability
of unity by making the orthogonal measurement. On the other hand, she can recognize
the difference between other states perfectly with the orthogonal measurement.
Here, we estimate a probability that Eve can tell the difference between |Ez00〉 and
|Ez11〉. We define the following two density operators:
ρz00 =
1
〈Ez00|Ez00〉
|Ez00〉〈Ez00|,
ρz11 =
1
〈Ez11|Ez11〉
|Ez11〉〈Ez11|. (71)
We describe a two-dimensional Hilbert space spanned by {|Ez00〉, |Ez11〉} as H′. Then, ρz00
and ρz11 are defined on H′. An orthonormal basis {|e0〉, |e1〉} defined on H′ is given by
|e0〉 = 1√
F
|Ez00〉,
|e1〉 = 1√
F | sin θ|(|E
z
11〉 − cos θ|Ez00〉). (72)
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We can write down matrix representations of ρz00 and ρ
z
11 with the basis {|e0〉, |e1〉} as
ρz00 =
(
1 0
0 0
)
,
ρz11 =
(
cos2 θ sin θ cos θ
sin θ cos θ sin2 θ
)
, (73)
where 0 ≤ θ < pi.
Here, we define the trace distance as follows [23]:
||ρz00 − ρz11||t = tr|ρz00 − ρz11|
= 2 sin θ, (74)
where |X| =
√
X†X for an arbitrary operator X . We write the maximum probability
that Eve can distinguish between |Ez00〉 and |Ez11〉 as Pmax00,11. It is shown in Ref. [24] that
Pmax00,11 is provided by the following formula:
Pmax00,11 =
1
2
+
1
4
||ρz00 − ρz11||t
=
1
2
(1 + sin θ). (75)
Moreover, letting Pmax01,10 be the maximum probability that Eve can recognize the difference
between |Ez01〉 and |Ez10〉, we apparently obtain
Pmax01,10 = 1. (76)
Now, we divide the four states {|Ezij〉 : i, j ∈ {0, 1}} into two groups, {|Ez00〉, |Ez11〉}
and {|Ez01〉, |Ez10〉}. We have described the maximum probability that Eve can distinguish
between |Ez00〉 and |Ez11〉 as Pmax00,11 and written down the maximum probability that she can
recognize difference between |Ez01〉 and |Ez10〉 as Pmax01,10. If Alice detects the signal |0z〉, a
probability that the state of Eve’s probe collapses to |Ez00〉 is equal to F and a probability
that it irreversibly falls into |Ez01〉 is given by (1 − F ). Similarly, if Alice observes the
signal |1z〉, a probability that the state of Eve’s probe collapses to |Ez11〉 is given by F and
a probability that it irreversibly falls into |Ez10〉 is equal to (1− F ).
Thus, if Alice and Bob communicate with the z basis, we can define the maximum
probability Pmax|0〉,|1〉 that Eve makes an accurate guess at a random secret bit sent by Alice
as
Pmax|0〉,|1〉 = FP
max
00,11 + (1− F )Pmax01,10
=
F
2
(1 + sin θ) + (1− F ). (77)
From Eq. (66), we obtain
cos θ = 2− 1
F
. (78)
Making use of Eq. (78) and putting D = 1− F , we can write down Pmax|0〉,|1〉 as follows:
Pmax|0〉,|1〉 =
1
2
[1 +D +
√
(2− 3D)D], (79)
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Figure 1: Graphs of PE as functions of the disturbance D. The thick solid and thin
dashed curves represent PE for the six-state protocol given by Eq. (80) and PE for the
BB84 scheme given by Eq. (85), respectively. Looking at both the graphs of PE, we notice
the following properties. If D = 0, we obtain PE = 1/2, so that Eve makes a completely
random guess at the secret bit sent by Alice. Contrastingly, if D = 1/2, PE = 1 holds
and Eve guesses absolutely right at the secret bit that Alice sends. For 0 ≤ D ≤ 1/2, PE
increases monotonically. From both the graphs, we conclude that the six-state protocol
is safer than the BB84 scheme.
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Figure 2: Graphs of IE as functions of the disturbance D. The thick solid and thin
dashed curves represent IE for the six-state protocol given by Eq. (83) and IE for the
BB84 scheme given by Eq. (87), respectively. Turning our eyes to both the two graphs,
we become aware of the following features. If D = 0, we obtain IE = 0, so that Eve
cannot gain any information. By contrast, if D = 1/2, IE = 1 holds and Eve makes a
completely accurate guess at the random secret bit sent by Alice. For 0 ≤ D ≤ 1/2, IE
increases monotonically. Looking at both the two graphs, we conclude that the six-state
protocol is safer than the BB84 scheme.
where we assume that the disturbance D satisfies 0 < D ≤ 1/2.
Obviously, in quantum transmission with an arbitrary t basis ∀t ∈ {x, y, z}, the max-
imum probability that Eve guesses right at a random secret bit sent by Alice is equal to
Pmax|0〉,|1〉 given in Eq. (79). Finally, we attain the following results:
QAB = 1−D,
PE = P
max
|0〉,|1〉 for 0 < D ≤ 1/2. (80)
In Fig. 1, we plot a graph of PE as a function of the disturbance D.
Next, we think about Eve’s Shannon information IE. The Shannon information Eve
gains is defined as
IE = 1 + FH(P
max
00,11) + (1− F )H(Pmax01,10), (81)
where
H(P ) = P log2 P + (1− P ) log2(1− P ). (82)
Substitution of Eqs. (75) and (76) into Eq. (82) gives
IE = 1 +
2
√
(2− 3D)D
ln 4
arccoth
( 1−D√
(2− 3D)D
)
− 2(1−D)
ln 4
ln
[2(1−D)
1− 2D
]
. (83)
In Fig. 2, we draw a graph of IE as a function of the disturbance D.
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For your reference, we compare results for the collective attacks on the BB84 scheme
and those obtained above. According to Cirac and Gisin’s work, the following two param-
eters characterize Eve’s unitary operator U for collective attacks under specific symmetry
in the BB84 scheme [21]:
F = 1−D = 〈Et00|Et00〉 = 〈Et11|Et11〉,
G = 〈Et00|Et11〉 = 〈Et11|Et00〉 for t ∈ {x, z}. (84)
If G = F (2F − 1) holds, the probability that Eve makes an accurate guess at a random
secret bit sent by Alice becomes maximum, and we obtain
PE =
1
2
+
√
D(1−D). (85)
Then, the probability that Alice and Bob cannot notice Eve’s interference is given by
QAB = 1−D. (86)
We plot a graph of PE provided by Eq. (85) in Fig. 1. Moreover, the Shannon information
IE that Eve gains is written in the form,
IE =
ln(1− 2D)
ln 2
+
2
ln 2
√
D(1−D)arctanh(2
√
D(1−D)). (87)
We plot a graph of IE given by Eq. (87) in Fig. 2.
From Figs. 1 and 2, we can conclude that the six-state protocol is safer than the BB84
scheme.
6 A connection between the six-state protocol and
the E91 scenario
We can regard the six-state protocol as a simplified version of the E91 scenario. In the
E91 procedure, a source generates the maximally entangled state for a pair of qubits and
these qubits fly apart towards Alice and Bob as follows:
|Ψ−〉AB = (1/
√
2)(|0〉A|1〉B − |1〉A|0〉B), (88)
where indices A and B represent Alice and Bob, respectively. Now, we assume that Alice
and Bob each observe their qubits with one of the following three Hermitian operators
randomly and independently:
E(et) = et · σ = |0t〉〈0t| − |1t〉〈1t| for t ∈ {x, y, z}, (89)
where ex = (1, 0, 0), ey = (0, 1, 0), and ez = (0, 0, 1).
If Alice observes E(ez)A and detects |0z〉A, the state of Bob’s qubit collapses to |1z〉B.
By contrast, if Alice perceives |1z〉A, the state of Bob’s qubit falls into |0z〉B. If Alice
performs measurement of E(ex)A or E(ey)A, similar things happen for Bob’s qubit. Here,
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we assume that Alice and Bob keep their results of the measurement handy on condition
that they observe E(et)A and E(et)B with the same et. Contrastingly, we assume that
Alice and Bob discard their results of the detections on condition that they carry out
their observations with different axes from each other, that is to say, E(et)A and E(et′)B
with t 6= t′. Moreover, we assume that Alice produces the maximally entangled state by
herself instead of the source and sends the single qubit of the pair to Bob. Then, this
process and the six-state protocol are in exactly the same situation [25].
In this process, Alice and Bob cooperate in the measurement of the following quantity:
S =
∣∣∣ ∑
t∈{x,y,z}
AB〈Ψ−|E(et)A ⊗ E(et)B|Ψ−〉AB
∣∣∣
= 3. (90)
If Eve eavesdrops on neither of the qubits, Eq. (90) holds.
Next, we think the value of S defined in Eq. (90) on condition that Eve interferes
in both the qubits that are sent to Alice and Bob, respectively. Here, temporarily, we
assume that the maximally entangled state is generated not by Alice but by the source
and Eve makes the intercept/resend attacks on the quantum channel between the source
and Alice and that between the source and Bob. Moreover, for the sake of convenience,
we assume that Eve mounts the intercept/resend attacks on both the quantum channels
independently.
Eve intercepts the qubit sent to Alice, performs an orthogonal measurement with
E(na)A on it, and resends an alternative qubit to Alice according to the result obtained
by the observation. Similarly, Eve intercepts the qubit sent to Bob, makes an orthogonal
measurement with E(nb)B on it, and resends an alternative qubit to Bob depending on
the result obtained by the measurement.
In these processes, we put E(n) = n · σ as shown in Eq. (89). Moreover, we assume
that na and nb are arbitrary normalized real three-component vectors. If |n| = 1, E(n)
is a Hermitian operator which has two eigenvalues ±1 and its eigenvectors are given by
|ϕ(n)0〉 = 1√
2(1 + nz)
(
1 + nz
nx + iny
)
,
|ϕ(n)1〉 = 1√
2(1− nz)
( −1 + nz
nx + iny
)
. (91)
We let ρ(na,nb) represent a probability that Eve chooses na and nb. This probability
distribution satisfies the following relations,
0 ≤ ρ(na,nb) ≤ 1, (92)∫
dnadnbρ(na,nb) = 1. (93)
Writing a probability that Eve detects |ϕ(na)i〉A ⊗ |ϕ(nb)j〉B for |Ψ−〉AB as
PEve(na, i;nb, j) with i, j ∈ {0, 1}, we obtain it in the form,
PEve(na, i;nb, j) =
∣∣∣AB〈Ψ−|(|ϕ(na)i〉A ⊗ |ϕ(nb)j〉B)∣∣∣2
=
1
4
[1− (−1)i+jna · nb]. (94)
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Then, because PEve(na, i;nb, j) is a probability, it satisfies the following relations,
0 ≤ PEve(na, i;nb, j) ≤ 1, (95)∑
i∈{0,1}
∑
j∈{0,1}
PEve(na, i;nb, j) = 1. (96)
When Eve detects |ϕ(na)i〉A ⊗ |ϕ(nb)j〉B, she sends these states to Alice and Bob as
the pair of the qubits. Then, if Alice and Bob observe E(et)A and E(et)B respectively,
an expectation value of a product of outputs produced by the detections of E(et)A and
E(et)B is given by
(A〈ϕ(na)i| ⊗ B〈ϕ(nb)j |)[E(et)A ⊗ E(et)B](|ϕ(na)i〉A ⊗ |ϕ(nb)j〉B)
= A(na, i; et)B(nb, j; et), (97)
where A(na, i; et) and B(nb, j; et) are expectation values of Alice and Bob’s observations
respectively and we can write down them in the form,
A(na, i; et) = (−1)ina · et, (98)
B(nb, j; et) = (−1)jnb · et. (99)
Here, we confirm that Eve’s intercept/resend attack is equivalent to the hidden variable
model for Alice and Bob. First of all, Eve obtains four physical quantities, na, nb, i, and
j. Thus, these four quantities are hidden variables. We can regard these four hidden
variables as random ones and their probability distribution is given by
ρ˜(na,nb, i, j) = ρ(na,nb)PEve(na, i;nb, j). (100)
From Eqs. (92), (93), (95), and (96), we obtain
0 ≤ ρ˜(na,nb, i, j) ≤ 1, (101)∫
dna
∫
dnb
∑
i∈{0,1}
∑
j∈{0,1}
ρ˜(na,nb, i, j) = 1. (102)
Describing an expectation value of the product of the outputs obtained by Alice and Bob’s
observations with E(et)A and E(et)B as C¯(et, et), we can write down it as
C¯(et, et) =
∫
dna
∫
dnb
∑
i∈{0,1}
∑
j∈{0,1}
ρ˜(na,nb, i, j)A(na, i; et)B(nb, j; et). (103)
This equation implies a hidden variable model. Substitution of Eqs. (94), (98) (99), and
(100) into Eq. (103) provides
C¯(et, et) = −
∫
dna
∫
dnbρ(na,nb)[(na · nb)(na · et)(nb · et)]. (104)
Under this hidden variable model, the quantity S in Eq. (90) corresponds to the following
physical value:
S¯ ′ =
∣∣∣C¯(ex, ex) + C¯(ey, ey) + C¯(ez, ez)∣∣∣. (105)
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Substitution of Eq. (104) into Eq. (105) gives us an inequality,
S¯ ′ =
∣∣∣− ∫ dna
∫
dnb(na · nb)
∑
t∈{x,y,z}
(na · et)(nb · et)ρ(na,nb)
∣∣∣
=
∫
dna
∫
dnb(na · nb)2ρ(na,nb)
≤ 1. (106)
As a result of the above discussion, we attain the following conclusion. On the one hand,
if Eve mounts the intercept/resend attack, Alice and Bob’s observations are described
with the hidden variable model and the inequality S¯ ′ ≤ 1 is satisfied. On the other hand,
if Eve does not interfere in Alice and Bob’s quantum transmission, S = 3 holds and Alice
and Bob’s detections violate the inequality for the hidden variable model.
Furthermore, if Eve does not touch the qubit sent to Alice and launches the inter-
cept/resend attack only on the qubit travelling towards Bob, we have the probability
ρ(na,nb) = δ(na − et)ρ(nb) and S¯ ′ is given by
S¯ ′ =
∣∣∣− ∫ dna
∫
dnb(na · nb)
∑
t∈{x,y,z}
(na · et)(nb · et)ρ(nb)δ(na − et)
∣∣∣
=
∫
dnbρ(nb)
∑
t∈{x,y,z}
(nb · et)2
= 1, (107)
where we use
0 ≤ ρ(nb) ≤ 1, (108)∫
dnbρ(nb) = 1. (109)
On this occasion, the inequality S¯ ′ ≤ 1 holds, too.
Here, we consider the following problem. If Eve makes the collective attack only on
the qubit that the source sends to Bob, what is the value of S? In this problem, we pay
attention to the fact that Eve does not interfere in the qubit sent to Alice. Then, we can
expect Eve to make the optimum collective attack obtained in Sec. 4.
According to the considerations given in Sec. 4 for Eve’s optimum strategy, Eve let
the qubit sent to Bob develop as follows:
(|0z〉〈0z|)B −→ F (|0z〉〈0z|)B + (1− F )(|1z〉〈1z|)B,
(|0z〉〈1z|)B −→ F cos θ(|0z〉〈1z|)B,
(|1z〉〈0z|)B −→ F cos θ(|1z〉〈0z|)B,
(|1z〉〈1z|)B −→ (1− F )(|0z〉〈0z|)B + F (|1z〉〈1z|)B. (110)
We assume that the maximally entangled state emitted by the source changes into the
following form because of Eq. (110):
(|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|)AB −→ ρ′AB. (111)
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Then, the following relation holds:
tr[ρ′AB(E(et)A ⊗ E(et)B)] = 1− 2F for t ∈ {x, y, z}. (112)
Thus, with the help of Eq. (90), we obtain
S =
∑
t∈{x,y,z}
∣∣∣tr[ρ′AB(E(et)A ⊗ E(et)B)]∣∣∣
= 3(1− 2D). (113)
Finally, from Eqs. (106) and (113), we can conclude that we cannot describe the collective
attack as the hidden variable model for D < 1/3.
7 Discussion and the conclusions
In Sec. 3, we acquire Eve’s optimum strategy of the intercept/resend attack on the six-
state protocol. This is a new result. In actual fact, an article in which Eve’s best strategy
of the intercept/resend attack on the six-state protocol is examined has not been published
yet.
In Sec. 3, when we look for Eve’s optimum strategy of the intercept/resend attack, we
do not perform parameter optimization. By contrast, in order to show that the Breidbart
basis is optimum for the intercept/resend attack in the BB84 scheme, we have to carry out
parameter optimization [4]. From these facts, we notice that we can discover Eve’s best
strategy for the six-state protocol more easily than the BB84 scheme. This is because the
six-state protocol has more constraints than the BB84 scheme, so that the optimization
problem for the six-state protocol becomes simpler than the BB84 scenario.
In the analyses of the collective attack, we become aware that the problem concerning
the six-state protocol is more simplified than that about the BB84 scheme, too. According
to Cirac and Gisin’s results, in order to examine the security of the BB84 scheme against
the collective attack, they imposed Eq. (35) for the z and x bases and the following
condition upon Eve’s unitary operator U [21]:
〈Ezij |Ezkl〉 = 〈Ezi⊕1,j⊕1|Ezk⊕1,l⊕1〉 for i, j, k, l ∈ {0, 1}. (114)
Then, Eve’s unitary operator is characterized by two real parameters. Contrastingly, in
Sec. 4 of the current paper, only by assuming Eq. (4) with F = F ′ and Eq. (35), we can
describe Eve’s unitary operator U with a single real parameter.
When the authors of the present paper calculated the matrix elements of U , they
expected that Eve’s best strategy was characterized by two or more real parameters.
Actually, the authors of the present paper predicted that the number of real parameters
of U for the six-state protocol was equal to or larger than that for the BB84 scheme. On
the contrary, even if we assume Eq. (35), Eve’s optimum strategy is characterized only
with a single real parameter. This fact implies that the number of bases utilized during
quantum communication of the six-state protocol is larger than that of the BB84 scheme
and many constraints restrict Eve’s strategy.
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From the calculations carried out in Sec. 4, we obtain the following relation:
〈Et00|Et01〉 = 〈Et00|Et10〉 = 〈Et11|Et01〉 = 〈Et11|Et10〉 = 0 for t ∈ {x, y, z}. (115)
This relation is equivalent to Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin’s condition which is ap-
plied to Eve’s unitary operator U [2]. Strictly speaking, Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin
imposed a condition that the fidelity was given by F with the t basis ∀t ∈ {x, y, z} and
Eq. (115) upon Eve’s unitary operator.
In the current paper, we assume Eq. (35) for identifying Eve’s unitary operator U .
Equation (35) suggests that the unitary operator U acts symmetrically on the t basis
∀t ∈ {x, y, z} that Alice and Bob choose for communication through the quantum channel,
that is to say, effects caused by U are preserved for an arbitrary t basis. Thus, the physical
meaning of Eq. (35) is very general and fundamental.
Contrastingly, Eq. (115) which was imposed upon Eve’s unitary operator U by
Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin has the following ideas. First, the relation
〈Et00|Et01〉 = 〈Et11|Et10〉 = 0 involved in Eq. (115) assumes that Eq. (31) is given in the
form of the Schmidt decomposition [23]. We think that this assumption is not obvious
under these circumstances. Second, the relation 〈Et00|Et10〉 = 〈Et11|Et01〉 = 0 included in
Eq. (115) puts us in the following situation. On the one hand, Eve obtains the state |Et00〉
on condition that Alice sends |0t〉 and Bob detects |0t〉. On the other hand, Eve gains the
state |Et10〉 only if Alice sends |1t〉 and Bob observes |0t〉. The relation implies both these
states are orthogonal to each other, namely, 〈Et00|Et10〉 = 0. We cannot conceive of this
assumption immediately and it forces Eve’s unitary operator U into satisfying very high
symmetry.
We can understand this fact well by letting t = z for Eq. (4), assuming F = F ′, and
bringing Eq. (115) into effect. In this case, we obtain the following relation straightfor-
wardly:
〈A|B〉 = 〈A|D〉 = 〈B|C〉 = 〈C|D〉 = 0. (116)
Putting this relation and Eqs. (11), (13), (14), and (15) Bruß obtained together, we
become aware that we impose very severe conditions upon Eve’s unitary operator U .
Summing up the above arguments, we understand that we apply simpler symmetry
to Eve’s unitary operator U in the present paper than Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin.
In Ref. [2], Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin showed that Eve’s unitary operator U was
characterized by a single real parameter as shown in Eqs. (67) and (69) and obtained
Eq. (66). Thus, although Ref. [2] and the current paper impose different conditions upon
Eve’s collective attack, both lead to the same optimum strategy for Eve. Hence, to derive
Eve’s best tactic, we do not need to apply high symmetry to Eve’s attack. This is a new
result of the present paper.
Eve’s unitary operator U is defined on a four-dimensional Hilbert space, so that it
contains fifteen real parameters, essentially. However, it is very difficult for us to optimize
these fifteen parameters at the same time. Thus, we need to reduce the number of pa-
rameters by applying specific symmetry to the unitary operator U . The reference written
by Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin and the current paper impose different symmetry
upon U and find the same optimum strategy for Eve. This is the important significance
of the current paper. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin’s work and the present paper
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are complementary to each other and the result of both of them implies that Eve’s best
strategy obtained is correct.
In Sec. 6, we discuss the connection between the six-state protocol and the E91 scheme.
We show that the collective attack cannot be described as the hidden variable model on
particular occasions although the intercept/resend attack can be always regarded as the
hidden variable model. This suggests that Eve’s collective attack makes use of entangle-
ment between the qubit transmitted from Alice to Bob and Eve’s probe. Eve observes her
probe according to the disclosed classical information about the basis used in Alice and
Bob’s observations. This operation lets Eve utilize the entanglement. This fact means
that the collective attack is more sophisticated than the intercept/resend attack.
The current paper concludes that the six-state protocol is safer than the BB84 scheme
for not only the intercept/resend attack but also the collective attack. This result has
been pointed out in Ref. [2] already, so that it is not novel. Looking at Figs. 1 and 2,
superiority of the six-state protocol over the BB84 scheme is not distinctive.
Here, we consider whether or not the six-state protocol is more practical than the
BB84 scheme. On the one hand the BB84 scheme uses the four states; on the other hand
the six-state protocol utilizes the six states. However, it is not a serious disadvantage for
the six-state protocol to prepare the six states. This is because we can construct the y
basis easily by applying beamsplitters and waveplates to the z basis. More precisely, in
order to convert the z basis into the y basis, we need only quantum gates acting on a
single qubit but not those that act on two qubits and generate entanglement.
However, the capacity of transmission for the six-state protocol is fewer than that for
the BB84 scheme. Here, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that Eve does not interfere
in Alice and Bob’s communication. For the BB84 scheme, a probability that Alice and
Bob choose the same basis is equal to 1/2. In contrast, for the six-state protocol, the
probability that Alice and Bob select the identical basis is given by 1/3. Thus, the BB84
scheme is more efficient at transmitting signals than the six-state protocol.
As mentioned above, the six-state protocol is less practical than the BB84 scheme.
However, because the six-state protocol gives severer constraints on Eve’s attacks than
the BB84 scheme, it is easy for us to find Eve’s optimum strategies of the six-state protocol.
This fact implies that Alice and Bob can easily predict Eve’s strategies for eavesdropping.
The authors of the current paper expect that the similar things also happen for multi-qubit
coherent attacks. This is one of the distinguished characteristics the six-state protocol
has. It is one of the conclusions of the present paper.
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